Soissons 1918: A Book Review

Soissons 1918 (Texas A&M Press, 1999)

            Douglas Johnson and Rolfe Hillman, Jr began writing Soissons 1918 with three specific intentions.  In order to capture the full reality of the first major military offensive by the United States in World War I, they planned to 1) give a comprehensive view of the Soissons battle 2) evaluate the American Expeditionary Force (AEF)’s  participation within the battle and 3) examine the leadership roles that directed, helped and hindered the Allies success.  (xv-xvi)

            The success of Johnson and Hillman’s goal to “tell the tale of an often forgotten battle” depends on their intended audience (xv).  To be sure, the authors do give a thorough description of the Battle of Soissons which began July 18 and continued on until August 6.  However, within their detailed description lies a mass of technical, tactical maneuvers, a multitude of officer names and foreign place names with little to no point of reference.  For the student first commencing their education in military history, Soissons 1918 falls into the category of “can’t see the forest for the trees,” only in this case it would be “can’t see the battle for the technicalities.” 

            Still, for those readers who come to the book with previous knowledge of military terms, techniques and French geography, then the book fulfills the authors’ purpose.  Johnson and Hillman provide a plethora of details that take the reader through a comprehensive day-by-day account of the battle from the AEF’s perspective.  In their introduction, the authors begin by giving the cause of the war.  “War came because no one in a position of authority could muster the courage to act decisively in time to stop the first troop movement, after which everything unfolded according to its own logic.” (3)  They then describe American military progress and status, and then lead into the specific Battle of Soissons on July 18, 1918.  From there they depict the various tactics and stratagems employed by the AEF until the end of the battle on August 6.

            To support their descriptions, the authors drew from previous historical accounts, military reports, witness statements, and journal entries.  While they were able to piece together a comprehensive view of the battle, the authors confessed confusion at various points where the locations of specific commanders were unknown or when multiple accounts differ as to the actual sequence of events.  The first-hand accounts the authors used added an extra dimension to the faceless personalities described and helped to clarify specific events and people.

            The theme of this being a transitioning war was successfully captured within the given accounts.  From the new strategies and weapon maneuvers to the transition of training both soldiers and officers for the new style of European warfare, the American forces were forced to suffer, learn and adapt as they went along.  Trench warfare and the German’s heavy reliance on machine guns proved to be weighty lessons for the AEF and resulted in heavy casualties. 

            The second goal of the authors, to evaluate the performance of the AEF’s first European, military offensive with specific regards to the use of divisions, achieved greater success than their first objective.  Within each chapter, the authors broke down the divisions into their specific components, and then gave an account of the X brigade’s specific role on July X.  With each account, the authors tried to give an objective rendering of both the accomplishments and the failures.  On one account of the 1^st Brigade the author’s wrote,

“Dashing into the midst of a stunned enemy’s positions, the American infantry overwhelmed those who stood and fought . . . Some became misoriented, but they pressed on to do whatever needed doing wherever they were . . . Every step forward brought with it a bit more disorganization, a bit less cohesion.” (52)

            However, despite the multitudinous references to the troops’ performance, many of the references and evaluations possessed the same theme and point.  The troops were tired and exhausted, disorganized and untrained, but they had spirit and pushed forward.  The lack of artillery supplies and knowledge proved to be one of the largest obstacles to the troops.  They lacked the basic strategic knowledge of their French and British counterparts, and oftentimes their actions seemed foolhardy and costly.  The authors primary and most concise assessment of the divisions stated, “It was not a neat and orderly maneuver, nor was it an exemplary exercise in generalship.  It was, in fact, a confused mess . . . a complete mix-up of men and organizations.  But Soissons stands at a distinct point of transition.” (144) 

            The transitions proved especially difficult for the commanding officers who led their troops into battle.  Johnson and Hillman provided numerous accounts of both faulty and qualified commanders; thus accomplishing their third goal.  Many of the officers were poorly trained or possessed training for a different style of warfare.  Those who had experience gained it in the marshes of the Philippines or jungles of the Caribbean.  Many of the miscommunications that resulted in mass chaos and severe losses came about because of faulty leadership. Those who managed to quickly assess the location, status and predicament of their troops, create a new plan of action and effectively communicate the plan to his peers managed to help push the Allies on to victory.

            The commanders who actively participated within the battles by successfully fulfilling their duties included Major General Summerall, Colonel Upton and General Pershing.  While Summerall was criticized for “wasting lives” due to a lack of confirmed intelligence, the authors made a point of clarifying that in spite of his faults, he learned from the experience, showing “development of his command attitudes after intensive command experience.” (140)  Col. Upton had a poor start and was originally passed over for a promotion; however, it was later stated that this brought him to his senses and allowed him to do “splendid work.” (67)  General Pershing was ahead of his fellow officers and noted the need for improved artillery cover and replacement troops.  Yet, his superiors tended to ignore his advice in the beginning.  He motivated the divisions and pushed them to their limits.  However, for every good commanding officer, there were other officers who proved difficult and unworthy of their position.  Brigadier General Buck proved a prime example of the Peter Principle (mentioned as a factor in the authors’ preface).  Time and again other officers would find him lost, confused or in a non-noteworthy position.  While officers of his sort did not help the American situation, the Americans were successful because of the few leaders who were determined to persist onward and demanded the same from their soldiers.

            Johnson and Hillman end their tale with the Conclusion which effectively sums up the high points, the low points and the lessons learned from both.  Their conclusion proves to be a very valuable resource for the beginning student who got lost in the jumble of names, tactics and officers.  Within the conclusion, the authors concisely restate the answers to their three primary objectives.   Ultimately, the Battle of Soissons was a ghastly battle during the latter half of July where hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives due to inexperience, faulty communication, poor leadership and lack of equipment.  However, the Americans proved themselves by making up for their lack of training with persistence and sheer will.  They learned from their mistakes, and while many looked down upon their techniques and skill, no one doubted their bravery.  In addition, the battle was a true test dividing the officers that could drive forward and effectively lead their regiments from those who became overwhelmed amidst the blood, confusion and miscommunication. 

            Did the authors accomplish their goal?  Yes.  They managed to put forgotten and unknown faces to lost commanders.  They provided glimpses into the lives of the tired and worn soldiers whose lives depended on their learning and transitioning speed.  They told the story of a battle and gave it a detailed analysis and evaluation, informing readers of a new era in US military history.  The Battle of Soissons gave a growing and expanding army a chance to prove themselves to the world, and they came out successful.